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INFORMATION REPORT

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OCUNTRY Austria/USSR

SUBJECT Reaction of KPOe to DATE DISTR. 22 NOV

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SUPPLEMENT TO

- On 10 October 1949, Hofmann, Communist Party district leader in Vienna I, spent some time in the SIV Purchasing Office on Schottengasse discussing the results of the Austrian parliamentary elections held on the previous day. He talked with Kasura, Director of the S.W Purchasing Office; Mitelman, S.V Purchasing Agent; Divald, a KPOe section leader; and Soviet and Austrian Communist employees of the STV.
- According to Mofmann, Erwin Scharf, the left-wing Socialist leader, left the .POe Central Cormittee headquarters at 10:45 a.m. on 9 October 1949, stating that he was no longer interested in learning the trend of the voting. Then KPOe Central Committee rerbero began to realize that their party was being defeated, Ernst Fischer, prominent Central Committee member, spoke at length on the subject of using forcible means to assure power, emphasizing Lenin's theory on the use of force and caying: "In our country, the only possible way of creating a People's Democracy is by physical force."
- Men the final election returns were received by Central Committee headquarters, parliamentary mandates were given to Johann Koplenia, President of the KPOe, Ernst Fischer, and Franz Honner, all of whom are numbers of the party Polithuro. A serious disagreement between party leaders and Scharf surporters crose, however, then the Communists realized that rrevious commitments to Scharf prevented Karl Altmann and Viktor Elser, also members of the KPOe Polithuro, from getting the remaining two mandates. According to Hofmann, the original agreement between the party and the leftwing Socialists was to share the mandates equally. The KPOe leaders were now challenging Scharf's right to the mandates, stating that he was not worthy of their generosity.
- During this neeting at the SW Purchasing Office, Kasura emphasized to Lastivka, chief bookkeeper of this SIN office, to Mitelan, and to other Soviet nationals, that the Austrian Communist Party needed armed assistance in order to achieve its ends. The group also discussed the desirability of dividing Austria into three parts like the present set-up in Gormany, suggesting that the Enns River be the boundary line between eastern and western Austria and that Vienna be administered separately.

CLASSIFICATION STATE EY# NAVY NSRB FBI

This document is hereby regraded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 16 October 1978 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist of the United States.

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- of the Communist Party apparently failed to vote for the left bloc. Farty members as well as the Russians seemed to be appalled by the election returns, and SW Communist employees were particularly surprised by the vote in the Zistersdorf area. Hofmann stated that he, himself, had anticpated the election outcome but that the Zistersdorf fiasco had dealt the Austrian Communist Farty a mortal blow. All evinced fear of the Union of Independents (VdU) rather than of the Socialist Party or People's Party. It was agreed by Mitelman, Kasura, and others, that in the event the VdU guined control of Austria's new federal army, Communist Party aspirations in Austria would be seriously jeoperdized.
- 6. Finally, the group discussed the importance of carrying out an energetic campaign of sabotage and strikes in Austrian factories before forthcoming trade union elections.